The national economy: heading for a dip? by James F. Dolmas
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Texas followed the nation into recovery at the
beginning of the year, but the state’s job losses
resumed in May, even as the nation continued its
anemic recovery. The current Texas recession is
shallower than previous ones but will probably
last longer. The extent to which Texas remains in
recession depends greatly on the strength of the
national and global economies.
If we define recession as two consecutive
quarters of negative employment growth coinci-
dent with gross state product (GSP) declines in at
least one quarter, Texas went into recession in
April 2001. Employment declined in the last three
quarters of 2001, picked up in first quarter 2002,
then declined again in the second and third quar-
ters (Chart 1). The September employment num-
bers (the latest data available) show a slight
decline of 0.4 percent (annualized) for total em-
ployment and a greater drop of 1.1 percent for pri-
vate employment. Employment is down 1.7 per-
cent (annualized) for the quarter and 0.2 percent
(annualized) year-to-date.
Looking at output, the Dallas Fed’s estimate 
of Texas GSP growth looks similar to U.S. GDP
The recession began in March 2001 and despite the events of September
11, appears to have ended the following November. How far have we come
since November 2001? And where are we headed?
The key features of the apparent expansion have been slow growth in
output and almost nonexistent growth in employment. The former is unsur-
prising, given the mildness of the 2001 recession. The latter, however, contrasts
sharply with the usual pattern of post–World War II expansions. In terms of
employment growth, the recovery from the 2001 recession is shaping up to
be a repeat of the jobless recovery that followed the 1990–91 recession.
Troubling as the lack of job growth has been, more worrisome still is 
evidence that the pace of the expansion has cooled, beginning around July.
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This evidence, which has come primarily
from measures of production, has raised
fears of a double-dip recession.
Over the same period, though,
barometers of the state of demand have
remained generally positive. Obviously,
production and demand cannot go in
opposite directions for long—particularly
since inventories have been pared down
at all stages of the economy’s supply
chain. At some point, either production
will have to pick up or demand growth
will have to slow. Which side will win
this tug-of-war is unclear. At the time this
article was written, the available data were
not signaling an imminent second dip.
Another notable feature of the on-
going expansion has been the falling
rate of inflation the economy has experi-
enced over the past year. Since mid-2001,
what had been a marked acceleration in
inflation has turned, suddenly, into a
marked deceleration, to the point where
concerns about deflation are surfacing.
This article presents a status report
on the health of the apparent recovery
and discusses some of the factors influ-
encing the economy’s near-term direction.
It also looks at the economy’s recent
inflation performance and the deflation
concerns it has engendered.
A Weak Expansion
While the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research is the final arbiter of the
dates of U.S. recessions and expansions—
and a determination from them is still
probably months away—every indica-
tion is that the 2001 recession ended last
November.
Chart 1 shows three coincident in-
dexes of economic activity—from the
Conference Board, the Economic Cycle
Research Institute and economists James
Stock and Mark Watson of Harvard and
Princeton universities, respectively. Coinci-
dent indexes amalgamate a large number
of economic variables in an attempt to
measure the overall level of economic
activity. All three indexes hit bottom in
November 2001—shown by the vertical
line in the chart—after which they begin
to rise.
The pace of output growth in this
expansion, though, has been slow. GDP
grew 3 percent in the year after its third
quarter 2001 trough. By comparison, out-
put growth over the first year of the
average post–World War II expansion is
closer to 6 percent. The slow output
growth in the current expansion is, how-
ever, consistent with the mildness of the
2001 downturn.
The Guitar String Theory of
Business Cycles
As a rule, mild recessions make for
weak recoveries and, conversely, deep
recessions make for strong recoveries.
Milton Friedman dubbed this the guitar
string theory of business cycles: The
smaller the pluck downward, the weaker
the snap back. By most measures, the 2001
recession was a very small pluck; hence,
we shouldn’t expect a sharp snap back.
Measuring a recession’s severity by the
percentage decline in GDP from its peak
to its trough ranks the 2001 recession as
nearly the mildest of the postwar period.
The scatter plot in Chart 2 illustrates
the guitar string theory. Each point cor-
responds to a recession/expansion epi-
sode. Points further to the right corre-
spond to deeper recessions, and those
higher up correspond to stronger recov-
eries. The star represents the most recent
episode. While the guitar string relation-
ship is looser for milder recessions, out-
put growth following the 2001 recession
has not deviated greatly from the histor-
ical pattern.
Another Jobless Recovery?
What has been surprising has been
the sluggish employment growth. Private
payrolls continued to fall for several
months after the overall economy began
to recover and are still below their Novem-
ber 2001 level. Since April—the point
when employment appears to have turned
the corner—the economy has gained a
mere 83,000 jobs.
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Could this simply be the guitar string
theory again? The answer is no; employ-
ment growth has been slow, even after
accounting for the mildness of the
downturn. The scatter plot in Chart 3 is
similar to the one in Chart 2 except that 
it measures severity of recession and
strength of rebound in terms of employ-
ment’s percentage decline during the
recession and percentage growth over
the first 11 months of expansion. Clearly,
the two most recent episodes are not
like the others, and our current experi-
ence is nearly a repeat of the 1990–91
recession and the jobless recovery that
followed.
Cooling Production Since July
While the slow pace of output
growth so far is probably not cause for
concern, evidence of a recent cooling in
the pace of the expansion certainly is.
This evidence, which began to accumu-
late in late summer, has come primarily
from the economy’s production side.
For example, surveys of firms’ pur-
chasing managers conducted by the Insti-
tute for Supply Management (formerly
the National Association of Purchasing
Management) indicate a significant de-
celeration in both the manufacturing and
service sectors since July. Industrial pro-
duction, measured by the Federal Reserve
Board, fell in August and September
after having registered seven consecutive
monthly increases. Aggregate weekly
hours worked, measured by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics, also dipped in late
summer.
Are We Headed for a 
Second Dip?
Is the economy tipping back into
recession? While concern is definitely
warranted, the data do not—so far—
point to a double-dip scenario. First, while
most indexes of leading indicators show
declines over the past few months, those
declines have been small. Meanwhile,
financial market indicators are sending
mixed signals about the future pace of
economic growth.
On the plus side, the yield spread—
the difference between interest rates of
long-maturity and short-maturity bonds
—remains high. Economic theory tells us
that when interest rates on long bonds
exceed interest rates on short bonds,
markets are expecting short rates to rise,
something generally associated with more
rapid economic growth. Thus, a high yield
spread generally signals a faster pace of
economic activity down the road.
On the other hand, the junk-bond
spread—the difference between interest
rates paid by issuers of junk bonds and
issuers of high-quality corporate debt—
has widened since spring. A bigger junk-
bond spread indicates tighter credit con-
ditions for below-investment-grade firms,
and, while this indicator has a short track
record, increases in it have generally por-
tended slower economic growth.
A final factor to consider when
weighing the possibility of a second dip
is the position of inventories. The great
inventory reduction that began in early
2001 seems to have run its course, with
Jobless Recovery Redux?
Growth in employment, first 11 months 

















Employment decline during NBER-dated recession (percent)
1980
2001












’02 ’01 ’00 ’99 ’98 ’97 ’96 ’95 ’94 ’93 ’92
SOURCE: Census Bureau.inventories bottoming out at all stages 
of the economy’s supply chain. At the
manufacturing stage, the ratio of inven-
tories to sales—currently around $1.30
in inventories for every $1 in sales—is
back to its prerecession level (Chart 4).
With inventories stripped down, pro-
duction will have to increase if demand
growth continues.
The Health of Demand
Hence, we turn to demand. It is
from here that most of the good news
has been coming lately. Firms’ invest-
ment in capital has recently shown some
spark of life, while consumer spending
continues to grow at a moderate pace.
The 2001 downturn was, if not an
investment-led recession, certainly an in-
vestment-fed recession. The declines in
just fixed investment—let alone inven-
tories—more than accounted for all the
GDP decline in the three quarters in which
output fell.
Investment has begun to rebound—
at least somewhat. Business fixed invest-
ment fell in the second quarter of 2002,
though by a much smaller amount than
in prior quarters. Within fixed investment
—which includes equipment, software
and structures—investment in equipment
and software grew in the second quarter
for the first time since mid-2000. Within
equipment and software, the information-
processing, or high-tech, portion regis-
tered growth in both the first and second
quarters. These components are not grow-
ing at nearly their prerecession rates, but
they are growing nonetheless.
Can investment growth be main-
tained? The outlook here is unclear. On
the plus side, corporate net cash flow
over the past few quarters has been up a
bit relative to its level of the past few
years. On the other hand, Census Bureau
data on shipments of capital goods and
orders for new capital show little evidence
of forward momentum. In particular, the
value of new orders has generally been
below the value of shipments through-
out 2002—that is, manufacturers of cap-
ital goods have been getting slightly less
than a dollar in new machinery orders
for every dollar’s worth of machinery they
ship. This would seem to portend slower
future growth in capital goods shipments.
What about consumers? Thus far in
the expansion they are a bit bowed, but
unbroken. After slowing late last year,
growth has rebounded in both consump-
tion spending and income. Retail sales
have been characterized by large boom-
to-bust swings owing to the on-again,
off-again incentive programs of auto
manufacturers. However, monthly sales
measures that exclude motor vehicles
have shown a much steadier, moderate
rate of growth since late last year, though
with some evidence of slowing in August
and September.
Will consumers continue to spend?
The picture here is probably brighter
than it is for firms. First, disposable in-
come has been growing faster than con-
sumer spending for most of 2002. As a
result, households’ savings rates have
risen considerably. Consumers, like firms,
have been repairing their balance sheets.
Also, while consumer indebtedness re-
mains high, so, too, does household net
worth—historically so, despite the stock
market’s recent woes. Finally, while the
unemployment rate has not yet begun 
to fall, its recession peak was at a level
below most of the nonrecession rates
experienced since the mid-1970s. To the
extent that joblessness affects consumer
spending, this could be a source of strength
going forward.
The Inflation Picture
Finally, we turn to inflation. Since
the middle of last year, what had been a
significant acceleration in the rate of
consumer price inflation has turned into
a sharp deceleration. The September Con-
sumer Price Index (CPI) registered a 12-
month inflation rate of 1.5 percent; most
core, or trend, measures of CPI inflation
are hovering near 2 percent (Chart 5 ).
Very low rates of measured inflation, to-
gether with falling prices in some CPI com-
ponents, such as commodities and durable
goods, have led to concerns that overall
deflation may now be a real danger.
While falling commodity and durable
goods prices are not, in themselves, evi-
dence of deflation—and may, in fact,
have reasonable explanations in terms of
productivity growth—very low overall
inflation rates may still warrant concern.
Why should we worry about the
possibility of deflation? Economic theory
is divided in its view of the consequences
of deflation. Many economic models sug-
gest that deflation should be actively pur-
sued, while others suggest that it should
be strenuously avoided. Real-world ex-
perience seems to favor the latter view.
The Japanese experience since the early
1990s, for example, vividly demonstrates
the difficulties that can arise in a defla-
tionary environment. As nominal interest
rates reach zero, the traditional stimulative
tools used  by central banks—interest
rate cuts—become unavailable, and ex-
pansionary policy can only be conducted
through extraordinary measures. An econ-
omy may find itself mired in a deflation-
ary trap that monetary policy is power-
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Consumer Price Inflation Shifts into Low Gear
12-month inflation rate (percent)
Chart 5
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The U.S. economy is, 
by some measures, 
as close to price 
stability as it has 
been at any time 
in five decades.
less to break. Some caution would thus
appear warranted.
But how close are we? With core CPI
inflation around 2 percent, it may seem
that we’re not really that close. However,
there may be good reason to view that 
2 percent figure as an overestimate of
the economy’s actual rate of inflation.
First, in spite of the many technical im-
provements made to the CPI over the
past several years, it’s likely that the
index is still biased upward—that is, that
it overstates the rate of consumer price
inflation. Also, the CPI focuses solely on
goods and services purchased by con-
sumers. If one looks at broader inflation
gauges—for example, the price indexes
for all of GDP or some of its major com-
ponents—one finds inflation rates near
50-year lows. Those inflation rates are
also quite a bit closer to zero, though still
positive.
As seen in Chart 6, the current annual
inflation rate for GDP less government,
housing and farms—at a little over 0.04
percent—is below all but one observa-
tion in the past 50 years. The U.S. econ-
omy is, by these measures, as close to
price stability as it has been at any time
in five decades.
What’s the bottom line on inflation?
By most measures, the economy’s over-
all inflation rate is quite low, but still
positive. Given the possible consequences
of deflation, though, further declines in
inflation may be undesirable. For the past
50 years, price stability—understood as
a low, stable rate of inflation—has been
pursued by restraining inflation from
above. In the current environment,
maintaining price stability may entail
supporting inflation from below.
Conclusions
Clearly, the presumptive expansion
is at a delicate stage. Some of the weak-
ness observed so far is to be expected
given the mildness of the 2001 recession,
but evidence of recent cooling is a cause
for concern. Nevertheless, the data sug-
gest that it is premature to conclude the
economy is facing a double-dip reces-
sion. Demand has held up thus far and—
given the stripped-down state of inven-
tories—may yet carry the day. Finally,
the reversal of fortune on the inflation
front has put us in a position where
maintaining price stability may—for the
first time in decades—mean boosting
inflation rather than containing it.
—James F. Dolmas
Dolmas is a senior economist in the Research
Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas.
GDP Inflation Near 50-Year Lows
Four-quarter inflation rate (percent)
Chart 6









Price index for GDP less
government, housing and farms
Price index for GDP
’02 ’92 ’82 ’72 ’62 ’52
0.79
0.04